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Budget constraints faced by governments in developing countries imply
that effectively targeting performance of public subsidies and social pro-
grams (whether the subsidies are provided in cash or in kind) is impor-
tant in reducing poverty.There are three main advantages to effective tar-
geting. First, for programs not intended to offer universal coverage, better
targeting helps reduce program outlay because there are fewer benefici-
aries. Second, for any given level of outlay, better targeting suggests that
the share of public expenditure that accrues to poor people typically will
be higher and so will enable the programs to have a larger impact on
poverty.Third, targeting may help reduce the potential negative incentive
effects or distortions in economic behavior associated with transfers if
fewer households are affected by the programs. For example, if fewer
households benefit from subsidized water or electricity service, there will
be less incentive to consume more than would be consumed normally if
the full cost of the service were paid by the household. Too much target-
ing, however, can produce negative incentive effects. In some industrial
countries, transfers may lead to poverty traps whereby the incentives for
some households to emerge from poverty are lessened by high implicit
taxation rates associated with increased income and decreased transfers.
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In this chapter, our objective is not to discuss the incentive effects asso-
ciated with social programs; rather, we intend to document the incidence
or distributional properties of the programs under way in Cape Verde, a
group of islands off the West African coast in the North Atlantic Ocean,
and to analyze whether some systems of targeting could help improve
targeting performance.1
According to the Cape Verde poverty report prepared by the World
Bank (2005), public transfers in Cape Verde represent, on average, be-
tween 5 percent and 13 percent of household income, depending on the
consumption quintile to which a household belongs. Most social public
spending is invested for education, health care, and pensions. As a result,
school enrollment rates are high and the country has been successful in
eradicating most communicable diseases and in achieving the best per-
formance levels for basic indicators among sub-Saharan African countries.2
Cape Verde, however, needs to improve the efficiency of its spending
because of budget constraints.The demands for education and health care
have increased, with nearly universal access to primary education trans-
lating into a higher demand for secondary and tertiary education. Unit
costs per student in primary school increased from $60 in 1993 to $128
in 2000.The increase at the secondary level was even larger, from $125 in
1993 to $334 in 2000 (World Bank 2005). Estimates suggest that the an-
nual unit cost for a student in tertiary education circa 2004–05 could be
as high as $2,000 (because of investment in new university facilities and
study-abroad programs promoted by the government).
Because overall life expectancy is high, the health care system faces the
challenge of providing subsidized and affordable medical care to a grow-
ing and aging population in need of expensive and complicated treat-
ments. Government expenditures on pensions also are substantial and the
financial situation of the contributory pension system is not sustainable
in the long run (see World Bank 2007).
Beyond an analysis of the incidence of public spending in Cape Verde,
we also provide a framework for analyzing the factors that determine the
targeting performance of social programs and transfers. Whereas most in-
dicators of benefit incidence are silent as to why subsidies are targeted the
way they are (that is, the indicators give only an idea of subsidies’ targeting
performance),3 we develop a simple decomposition that enables an analy-
sis of both “access” and “subsidy design” factors that affect subsidies’ over-
all targeting performance. Finally, we explore the potential for more effec-
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tive targeting of social programs in Cape Verde by comparing the target-
ing performance that could be achieved either under a proxy means-test-
ing system or under a geographic targeting system based on a poverty map
recently completed.
To sum up, to increase efficiency and limit costs, efforts must be made
to allocate resources to those segments of the population that most need
them. In this chapter, we analyze how public transfers are targeted using
data from a 2001–02 national household survey, and study the incidence
and coverage of public transfers. Because incidence analysis does not ex-
plain the rationale behind resource allocation, we look at the determi-
nants of the system’s targeting performance following a framework devel-
oped by Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007). We also discuss alternative
targeting mechanisms to improve performance.
Incidence of Public Transfers and Targeting Performance
This section provides an analysis of the incidence and coverage of public
transfers in Cape Verde, using data from the Inequérito às Despensas e Re-
ceitas Familiares household survey conducted by Cape Verde’s Ministry
of Finance and the National Institute for Statistics during the last
trimester of 2001 and the first trimester of 2002. The survey collected
general information on households and individuals (including data on de-
mographics, education, assets, and health) and comprehensive informa-
tion on income and expenditures. The stratified sample included 4,584
households (44 percent from rural areas) and was representative of the
total population (approximately 95,257 households).
Our analysis covers all public transfers that could be identified in the
household survey. Public spending for primary, secondary, and tertiary edu-
cation is considered, as are outlays for public pensions (that is, reform pen-
sions, which are traditional pensions, and minimum pensions, which target
poor people).4 The survey also included information on school stipends
(bolsas de estudo), other public subsidies (abonoes e subsídios diversos), and
social assistance (prestações de assistência social pelas administrações publicas
em género).
Many assumptions have been made in using the survey data. One as-
sumption is that the unit cost of providing basic in-kind public services—
say, in education and health—is similar across geographic areas or house-
hold categories that use these services. As noted by Wodon and Ye (2006)
Assessing the Targeting Performance of Social Programs: Cape Verde 419
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
in the case of Sierra Leone, when this assumption is not verified, it typi-
cally is because poor people benefit more than nonpoor people from
lower-cost (and lower-quality) services. This means that the estimates of
in-kind benefits accruing to the poor from the use of publicly provided
services, as presented here, are probably overstated.
To present and visualize our results on the incidence of public transfers,
we first rely on a diagram that provides three sources of information at
once (figure 13.1).The three indicators are the percentage of the poor pop-
ulation that benefits from any given income source, the percentage of the
total income from a source that is received by the poor, and the size of the
income source (that is, the total income from the source obtained by the
population as a whole). Here are the key results portrayed in the figure:
• Sizes of various transfers: Primary, secondary, and tertiary education;
health care; and reform pensions all represent large public transfers to
households (pensions are not purely public transfers, however; they are
partly private contributions because workers have contributed to the
pension scheme). Outlays for minimum pensions, school stipends, so-
cial assistance, and other public subsidies are much smaller.
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Figure 13.1. Incidence and Coverage of Remittances/Private Transfers, 2001–2002
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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• Coverage: For primary and secondary education and for health servic-
es, coverage levels are fairly high. For other transfers, coverage levels
are in the 10–15 percent range or even lower. For example, coverage of
tertiary education among the poor is virtually zero.
• Targeting: Given that poor people represent 36.7 percent of the coun-
try’s population,5 a lower share than 36.7 percent would mean that,
relative to their population size, poor people benefit less from trans-
fers than does the population as a whole.As expected, the targeting in-
dicators are more favorable for primary education than for secondary
education and health, with virtually none of the spending on tertiary
education benefiting the poor. The share of reform pension outlays
that reaches the poor also is minimal. About a third of the outlays for
the minimum pension schemes do reach the poor, but poor people still
receive a lower share of these outlays relative to their proportion of the
total population. That suggests weaknesses in the targeting system for
these pensions. About 40 percent of social assistance outlays reach the
poor, but the targeting indicator is lower for other public subsidies and
schooling stipends.
• Eradication of poverty: The large bubble on the upper right corner on Fig-
ure 13.1 represents the size of a perfectly targeted transfer that would
be sufficient to eradicate poverty (the coverage among the poor would
be 100 percent, as would be the targeting among the poor, since the
transfer would provide to each poor household exactly what is needed
to lift the household to the poverty line). Pooling the resources from var-
ious types of cash transfers could go a long way in reducing poverty if all
these resources were better targeted to the poor. Aiming for perfectly
targeted transfers is obviously difficult in most cases (such as reform
pensions, which are meant to replace income lost by retirement), and we
do not recommend it because many of the transfers are meant to cover
a larger population than the poor. Still, overall, only a small portion of
the transfers typically reach poor people so the effect of those transfers
on the reduction of poverty is relatively limited.
Following Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007), another way to look at
benefit incidence is to define a simple indicator of targeting performance,
Ω, which is the share of the subsidy benefits received by the poor (SP /
SH, where SP denotes the value of all subsidies accruing to the poor and
SH denotes the total value of the benefits received by the population as a
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whole) divided by the proportion of the population in poverty (P / H,
where P denotes the number of poor households or individuals and H de-
notes the number of households in the overall population. In mathemati-
cal notation, we have
Ω = Sp       Sh . (13.1)
P 

H
A value of 1.00 for Ω implies that the subsidy distribution is neutral,
with the share of benefits going to the poor proportional to their popu-
lation share. A value above (below) 1.00 for Ω implies that the subsidy
distribution is progressive (regressive): the poor receive a larger (small-
er) share of the benefits than their population share. The smaller the
number, the more regressive it is—and vice versa.
In our analysis, we also provide data on the public transfer allocations’
errors of exclusion. An error of exclusion occurs when a poor household
does not benefit from a subsidy. Denoting by Bp the proportion of house-
holds who get the public transfer (that is, the beneficiary incidence or
coverage level among the poor mentioned in the discussion of figure
13.1), the share of poor households excluded from the subsidy is
Error of exclusion = 1 – Bp. (13.2)
Figure 13.2 displays the value of the targeting performance indicator,Ω,
as well as the errors of exclusion for the public transfers described above
and for subsidies for the consumption of water and electricity (these val-
ues are obtained from Angel-Urdinola and Wodon 2007). As before, the
results suggest that public transfers related to primary education, social
assistance, minimum pensions, and health care are the most pro-poor
(that is, the value of Ω is greater than 1). With the exception of primary
education and, to some extent, health care, however, program coverage is
very limited because the errors of exclusion are often high. Other public
transfers (secondary education, the public study fund that provides grants
for schooling, electricity and water subsidies, reform pensions, and terti-
ary education) display values of Ω lower than 1, suggesting that resources
are allocated more heavily to nonpoor households than to poor house-
holds. Most of the programs with low values for Ω also have very limited
coverage, as suggested by their high errors of exclusion.
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Factors That Determine Targeting Performance
The data presented above suggest that many poor households in Cape
Verde do not receive a range of public transfers and that the values of the
targeting performance indicators Ω are often lower than 1. As Angel-
Urdinola and Wodon (2007) described in detail for the case of water and
electricity subsidies, there may be both “access” and “subsidy design” fac-
tors that contribute to low targeting performance and poor coverage.
Access factors can de divided into physical access (A) and usage or “take
up” of subsidies or services (U). Let AH represent the share of all house-
holds having physical access to (or being eligible for) a transfer or service.
For example, access to primary education is available only in communities
or geographic areas where there are schools. Given access, let UH|A be the
share of households who have physical access to a public transfer or service
and choose to use it or are eligible for it (this could not occur, for instance,
if parents do not send their children to school because they can’t afford the
fees or if eligible households do not receive a cash transfer to which they
are entitled because they lack information about the program).
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Figure 13.2. Indicators of Targeting Performance
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Subsidy design factors are those that determine the final distributional
incidence of the transfer, once we know who could benefit from the sub-
sidy or transfer because the household has access to it and is using the
service.A first subsidy design factor is the targeting mechanism used. TH|U
is defined as the share of households among those using a service that ac-
tually get the public transfer (that is, the beneficiary population among
the population that potentially can benefit from the transfer because it
has access and is using the service).
A second subsidy design factor is the rate of subsidization, R. Denote
the average unit cost of the service by C (such as the average annual unit
cost per student in primary school). C is assumed to be constant across
all households. The total cost of serving a customer is a function of C and
of the quantity consumed (or the number of beneficiaries using the serv-
ice), denoted by Q. If the average quantity consumed by subsidy recipi-
ents is QH|T, and the average private expenditure on the good (such as
co-payments for health care or education) is denoted by EH|T, then the
average rate of subsidization is RH|T = 1 – EH|T / (QH|T * C). As shown in
Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007), the parameter Ω can be described as
a product of five ratios, as follows (denoting by P the poor):
Ω = AP ✕
UP|A ✕
TP|U ✕
RP|T ✕
QP|T . (13.3)
AH UH|A TH|U RH|T QH|T
The first two ratios represent the service access rate among the poor di-
vided by the access rate among the population as a whole, followed by the
usage rate for a service (given access) for the poor compared with the rate
for the population as a whole. Typically, one would expect that the ratio
of access rates (A) would be lower than 1 because the poor tend to live in
areas with lower access to public transfers and services than the popula-
tion as a whole. Similarly, one would expect that the ratio of the usage
rates for transfers and services (U) would be lower than 1 because a lack
of information and, perhaps, a lack of funds makes poor people less likely
to use public services than is the population as a whole where there is ac-
cess. This “access-factors handicap” can be expected to work against the
targeting of public transfers to the poor. Subsidy design factors will need
to overcome the access handicap if the distribution of transfers is to be
progressive, so that the value of Ω is larger than 1.This result could be ob-
served among others if targeting is good (among those using the service,
the poor are more likely to receive the public transfer than is the popula-
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tion as a whole), if the unit reduction in price versus full cost received by
the poor is larger than for the nonpoor, or if the poor are likely to con-
sume more of the good than is the population as a whole when they have
been found eligible for the transfer (for example, the poor may have more
children enrolled in public schools than does the total population).
Table 13.1 provides the results of the above Ω decomposition to ex-
plain in more detail the key determinants of targeting performance for
the various public transfers observed in Cape Verde’s household survey.
For primary education and health care, which present values of Ω greater
than 1, access generally is high among the poor (that is, AP is close to 1 in
both cases), and usage rates are larger among the poor (that is, UP|A >
UH|A). The latter finding probably arises because richer households can
afford to choose to use private services for either education or health care.
We find, for instance, that usage rates for primary education are 10 per-
centage points higher than average among poor households, and rates for
health care are 3 percentage points higher. As expected, overall usage
rates for education are higher than for health care (78–87 percent versus
35–38 percent) because households are more likely to have children in
the education system than to have a member (presumably sick) actively
using health services. In terms of quantity consumed, we find that the Q
ratios for primary education and health care are close to 1. For education,
the Q ratio is slightly above 1 for education because, on average, poor
households are larger and thus more likely to have more children using
education services on a yearly basis (thus, QP|T = 2.03 > QH|T = 1.75). For
health care, the ratio is slightly below 1, which is not surprising because
richer households usually have a higher average of effective health con-
sultations per household each year (QP|T = 33.6 < QH|T = 34.22; these val-
ues are high because the number of recent visits is annualized). For sec-
ondary education, the value of Ω is also slightly lower than 1, mainly
stemming from a high Q ratio (QH|T = 1.6 > QP|T = 1.5), which results
from nonpoor households tending to have more children in secondary
school. Users of minimum pensions and social assistance programs, which
also display a value for Ω greater than 1, generally are poor households,
and thus AP * UP > AH * UH. Q ratios for these two programs, on the con-
trary, are usually lower than 1, which suggests that, on average, richer
households receive larger nominal benefits than do poor households.
Other programs (public subsidies, public study funds, and social assis-
tance programs) display Ω values below 1. For example, it is striking to
see that social assistance programs are not well targeted, and it would be
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useful to learn why this is true by examining the various subprograms in
this category.6 In any case, contrary to what we observed for minimum
pensions, users of these various programs and transfers are more likely to
be nonpoor households and thereby AP * UP < AH * UH). Furthermore,
Q ratios for these programs are lower than 1, which suggests that richer
households receive greater benefits, on average. As for utility services, low
Ω values for electricity and water subsidies result from a combination of
different subsidy rates and quantities consumed by poor and nonpoor
households. Although the rate of subsidization is greater for poor house-
holds than for all households (RP|T = 0.11 versus RH|T = 0.06), the aver-
age quantity (in kilowatt hours) consumed per month by poor house-
holds connected to the network is less than half the quantity consumed
in the population as a whole (QP|T = 49.31 versus QH|T = 111.72). Indeed,
because the system provides greater subsidies to households that con-
sume less (the country implemented an inverted block tariffs scheme),
this difference in consumption levels explains why the energy bills of
poor households are more discounted than bills of other households.
However, nonpoor households still receive a larger subsidy each month
than do the poor households because they consume more electricity and
almost all of their consumption is subsidized to some degree: the product
of RP|T / RN|T * QP|T / QN|T is 0.81.
7
Improving Targeting Performance
Targeting is a relevant subsidy factor for improving the allocation of re-
sources so that they become more beneficial for poor people. There are
several targeting mechanisms that policy makers can design to define cri-
teria for public transfer eligibility. Some of the more widely used mecha-
nisms are geographic targeting (whereby benefits are allocated in locali-
ties with high concentrations of poverty), quantity targeting (through
which benefits are allocated to users who consume smaller quantities of
service), and proxy means testing (whereby benefit allocations are based
on the prediction of a household’s poverty level, reflected by certain visi-
ble characteristics). Targeting mechanisms are well designed to the extent
they provide more accurate predictions of which households are poorer
(and therefore in greater need of public transfers). In this section, we an-
alyze the predictive power of means-testing and geographic mechanisms.
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Proxy Means Testing to Predict Household Poverty
Proxy means-testing mechanisms rely on a method of predicting house-
hold welfare based on visible characteristics. Like the other targeting
methods, proxy means testing may be used in combination with quantity
targeting or may be the sole basis for identifying subsidy beneficiaries.
To design a proxy means-testing mechanism, we relied on linear regres-
sions to predict household welfare. In particular, we used the natural log
of per capita expenditure as the dependent variable, and we controlled for
household characteristics that may predict per capita consumption and
that are easily verifiable by a social worker. These household-level vari-
ables include the log of the household size (to allow for nonlinearity),
whether the household head is female, the age of the head and the age
squared, the literacy and education levels of the head (the excluded cate-
gory is a household head who has no education), and other infrastructure
variables (for example, household access to electricity, piped water, and a
toilet; and a household dwelling’s type of walls, floor, and ceiling). We also
included a vector of geographic variables (a set of geographic dummies for
every island) and dummies reflecting whether households possess a series
of assets (television, radio, telephone, oven, refrigerator, washing machine,
bicycle, motorcycle, and other motor vehicles).To maximize the predictive
power of our regression, we relied on stepwise estimation.This method en-
sures that the set of available variables included in our model provides the
highest possible fit as measured by the R2.When the model was estimated,
we generated a predictor of the dependent variable. Additionally, we creat-
ed a dummy variable (poor) that takes the value of 1 if the “observed” value
of household per capita consumption is below the official poverty line
(equivalent to CVEsc 43,249.8 per capita annually), and a second dummy
(predicted poor) that equals 1 if the “predicted” value of the household’s per
capita consumption fulfills the same condition.
Regression results are available on request. In general, when making
statistical predictions based on linear regressions, two errors arise (Type I
and Type II errors). In our case, the Type I error (error of exclusion) would
consist of excluding from a targeted program households that are poor
but are predicted to be nonpoor on the basis of the proxy means-testing
mechanism; and the Type II error (error of inclusion) would consist of al-
locating program benefits to households that are nonpoor. Findings of
how well our model predicts poverty (and the size of the Type I and Type
II errors) are presented in table 13.2.
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In Cape Verde, 28.1 percent of all households are poor. As shown in
table 13.2, our model rightly predicted as “poor” 17.5 percent of the ac-
tual 28.1 percent, and it wrongly predicted the remaining 10.6 percent
(therefore, the Type I error is equivalent to approximately 38 percent, as
a share of the predicted poor). Table 13.2 presents similar results for ur-
ban and rural areas. The Type I error is 46 percent in urban areas and 30
percent in rural areas. Although the share of incorrectly predicted poor
households is somewhat high, more information should be collected be-
fore making a judgment of the model. In particular, the model still could
be considered a good one to the extent that most of the households mis-
predicted as poor are borderline nonpoor households (that is, they are only
marginally above the poverty line). Furthermore, by changing the poverty
line, the magnitude of the errors also change. We will conduct more de-
tailed analyses of this issue below. The Type II error of the model, meas-
ured by the poor households predicted to be nonpoor, is approximately 10
percent nationwide (4 percent in urban and 22 percent in rural areas).
We provide a more detailed analysis of the errors of inclusion and ex-
clusion by using a prediction matrix based on population decile (rather
than on household decile) of per capita consumption (table 13.3). Cape
Verde’s 28.1 percent poor households are equivalent to 36.7 percent of
the population (25 percent urban and 51 percent rural). For simplicity’s
sake in identifying the poor population, we used the third, fourth, and
fifth deciles of per capita consumption (weighted by the population
weights) as our new poverty lines at the urban, national, and rural levels,
respectively. According to the matrix, errors of exclusion are 10.0 per-
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Table 13.2. Errors of Exclusion and Inclusion in a Proxy Means-Testing Model 
All households
Targeting indicator National Urban Rural
Poor, predicted poor 0.175 0.095 0.295
Poor, predicted nonpoor 0.106 0.080 0.125
Error of exclusion 0.377 0.459 0.298
Nonpoor, predicted nonpoor 0.651 0.793 0.451
Nonpoor, predicted poor 0.069 0.032 0.129
Error of inclusion 0.095 0.039 0.222
Sample size (number of households) 4,583 2,463 2,120
Weighted sample size 95,237 54,283 40,954
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
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cent, 8.5 percent, and 13.5 percent at the national, urban, and rural lev-
els, respectively. Almost half of the individuals excluded (poor but pre-
dicted nonpoor) are borderline poor. The magnitude of the errors of in-
clusion is similar to that of the errors of exclusion. Most of the nonpoor
households “wrongly” predicted are also borderline nonpoor (that is, they
are only a little above the poverty line).
Now we turn to exploring how sensitive the prediction model is to the
choice of poverty line. To do so, we ranked our welfare predictor from the
lowest to the highest. Using household weights and size (and conserving the
ranking), we calculated the share of the total population represented by
each household in the survey.We defined as “predicted poor” all households
below our choice of poverty line (we used 20, 30, 40, and 50 percent of the
cumulative population distribution of the predictor, respectively). The real
“poor” (approximately 37 percent) are those households with observed per
capita incomes below the official poverty line—that is, below CVEsc
43,249.8 per capita annually. Our results are summarized in table 13.4.
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Table 13.4. Means-testing Performance under Different Poverty Lines
All households
Poor, Poor, Nonpoor, Nonpoor,
Sample considered predicted predicted predicted predicted
poor (%) poor (%) nonpoor (%) poor (%) nonpoor (%)
National
20.00 16.00 20.69 3.98 59.32
30.00 22.69 14.01 7.29 56.01
40.00 28.39 8.31 11.59 51.72
50.00 32.06 4.64 17.91 45.39
Urban
20.00 15.17 9.81 4.81 70.20
30.00 19.44 5.55 10.52 64.50
40.00 22.23 2.75 17.76 57.26
50.00 24.02 0.96 25.96 49.06
Rural
20.00 16.65 34.42 3.31 45.62
30.00 24.48 26.59 5.51 43.42
40.00 30.66 20.41 9.33 39.60
50.00 36.97 14.10 12.94 35.99
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
As suggested in table 13.4, using a cutoff point of 40 percent of the
predicted poor (the benchmark case because the actual poverty rate is 
37 percent), the model gives a good prediction of poor households, espe-
cially in urban areas. Urban poverty predictions are more accurate mainly
because urban households show a larger dispersion in terms of consump-
tion as well as asset levels than do rural households, which increases the
power of the proxy means-testing mechanism. Using higher (lower) cut-
off points results in a higher (lower) share of the actual “poor” being pre-
dicted poor, especially in urban areas. Of course, a higher (lower) cut-off
point increases (decreases) the probability that the model fails to exclude
nonpoor households from the targeted program. That may contribute to
an overinvestment (underinvestment) of social funds because the percent-
age of nonpoor households predicted to be poor becomes larger (smaller).
Geographic Targeting to Predict Household Poverty
Using census data and the Cape Verde poverty map (which predicts per
capita expenditure for all households included in the census), we ranked
all districts in the country, from the one with the highest average poverty
rate to the one with the lowest rate. We then calculated the overall popu-
lation share in every district. Keeping the rank constant, we calculated the
cumulative population distribution. All households belonging to the
provinces below 20, 30, 40, and 50 percent of the population distribution
were predicted as “geographically poor.”
As suggested by table 13.5, geographic targeting, like proxy means test-
ing, has a better predictive power in urban than in rural areas. By imple-
menting this method and assuming poverty rates of 20, 30, 40, and 50
percent of the population, respectively, we could predict correctly only
28 percent of the poor households in rural areas (versus 47 percent in ur-
ban areas), 40 percent (versus 61 percent), 51 percent (versus 72 per-
cent), and 62 percent (versus 82 percent). This result is not surprising be-
cause the urban poor population usually is concentrated in slum districts,
whereas poor households are more widely dispersed in rural districts.
As table 13.6 suggests, proxy means testing offers a better targeting
mechanism than does geographical targeting at the national, urban, and
rural levels when all households in the survey and census are included in
the analysis. This is true because both the errors of inclusion and the er-
rors of exclusion are smaller using proxy means-testing mechanisms than
using geographic targeting methods in all scenarios. This is to be expected
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because the proxy means-testing model controls not only for locality fac-
tors but also for other variables that predict welfare, such as type of hous-
ing characteristics and demographics.
Conclusion
Cape Verde spends heavily on public transfers, especially for health care,
education, and pensions. Although large government spending in the so-
cial sectors has made the country one of the best performers in West
Africa regarding the delivery of services in those sectors, the system needs
to improve the efficiency of its spending to ensure its sustainability. The
country’s expenditures on primary education and health care constitute a
large share of overall public transfers in nominal terms, and they are quite
pro-poor. However, other components of the social protection network
(such as pensions, public subsidies, public study funding, utility subsidies,
and higher education) are not reaching the poor adequately.
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Table 13.5. Geographic Targeting Using Census Data
All households
Poor, Poor, Nonpoor, Nonpoor,
Sample considered predicted predicted predicted predicted
poor (%) poor (%) nonpoor (%) poor (%) nonpoor (%)
National 
20.00 14.26 21.91 5.72 58.11
30.00 20.01 16.16 9.89 53.93
40.00 24.96 11.22 14.88 48.95
50.00 28.92 7.26 20.94 42.89
Urban areas
20.00 8.88 10.10 11.00 70.03
30.00 11.54 7.44 18.28 62.75
40.00 13.77 5.21 26.02 55.01
50.00 15.55 3.42 15.55 46.84
Rural areas
20.00 15.47 40.55 4.52 39.46
30.00 22.21 33.82 7.68 36.30
40.00 28.59 27.43 11.30 32.67
50.00 34.55 21.48 15.34 28.63
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The actual “poor”are defined as those households having annual consumption below CVEsc 43,249.8 per
capita (the official poverty line).
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
The targeting performance of public transfers in Cape Verde has a natu-
ral distributional handicap because poor households usually have an access
disadvantage: they are limited in access to infrastructure and information,
and they still cannot afford the services. To overcome this handicap, policy
makers must pay attention to the performance of subsidy-design factors
(such as targeting mechanisms and rates of subsidization). Results for
Cape Verde indicate that, apart from primary education and health care
(services with high rates of access and use among poor people), public
transfers are not being allocated in a pro-poor manner because of a combi-
nation of disadvantageous access factors among the poor and poorly per-
forming design factors (especially involving targeting mechanisms).
Finally, proxy means testing generally has better predictive power than
does geographic targeting, especially in rural areas where poverty is wide-
spread. In urban areas, the predictive advantage of means testing over ge-
ographic targeting is lower, probably because urban poverty is concentrat-
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Table 13.6. Geographical Targeting  Versus Proxy Means Testing
Geographical targeting Proxy means testing
using census using survey
Share of the sample Error of Error of Error of Error of
considered poor (%) inclusion (%) exclusion (%) inclusion (%) exclusion (%)
Full  sample Full  sample
National
20 28.63 27.38 19.92 25.86
30 33.08 23.06 24.32 20.01
40 37.35 18.65 28.99 13.84
50 42.00 14.48 35.84 9.27
Urban areas
20 55.33 12.60 24.07 12.26
30 61.30 10.60 35.11 7.92
40 65.39 8.65 44.41 4.58
50 50.00 6.80 51.94 1.92
Rural areas
20 22.61 50.68 16.58 43.00
30 25.69 48.23 18.37 37.98
40 28.33 45.64 23.33 34.01
50 30.75 42.87 25.93 28.15
Source: Authors’ estimation.
Note: The actual “poor”under means testing are defined as those households having per capita consumption
below CVEsc 43,249.8 annually (the official poverty line).
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
ed in slums. This poses a natural trade-off because policy makers con-
strained by tight budgets may choose to implement geographic targeting,
even when it sacrifices some predictive power.8
Notes
1. There is a large body of literature in this area. Several studies have been devot-
ed to assessing the targeting performance of a wide range of programs in devel-
oping and transition economies (for example, Grosh 1994; Subbarao et al.
1997; Braithwaite, Grootaert, and Milanovic 2000; and Coady, Grosh, and
Hoddinott 2004). In the case of utilities such as water and electricity, although
subsidies are very widespread, it is not clear that they are well targeted
(Wodon, Ajwad, and Siaens 2003; Komives et al. 2005; Angel-Urdinola, Cos-
grove-Davies, and Wodon 2006; and Angel-Urdinola and Wodon 2007). This
finding is problematic given that utility subsidies in developing and transition
economies often are more costly than other transfer programs (Alderman
2002).
2. Life expectancy at birth is 70.1 years; child mortality is 42 per 1,000 live births
among boys and 30 per 1,000 live births among girls; and the maternal mortal-
ity ratio was 150 to 100,000 live births in 2000 (see World Bank 2005 for more
details). These figures reflect both the relatively high income per capita in
Cape Verde and the high share of public spending devoted to health care.
3. For a good discussion of standard benefit incidence analysis, see Demery (2003).
4. There are two noncontributory social security schemes—one for people in
the Food for Work (FAIMO) public works program and one for other elderly
or disabled people. FAIMO is a labor-intensive infrastructure works program,
financed with food aid counterpart funds, that employs approximately
15,000 to 20,000 people annually.The aim of this program is to provide some
income security to the poor, especially those people who live in rural areas
and women who are heads of household. In 1992, a noncontributory pension
scheme was introduced for workers in FAIMO. All elderly people who have
worked at least 10 years in campaigns funded by the government are covered
(44 percent of the FAIMO workers have at least 10 years’ tenure), and inva-
lidity and old-age pensions are provided. All FAIMO pensioners receive a
fixed annual pension equivalent to $300. The Minimum Social Protection
(PSM) scheme is a noncontributory, means-tested program set up in 1995 to
provide income for people not covered by the other social protection pro-
gram. The PSM is fully financed with resources from official development as-
sistance. Approximately 7,000 families receive pensions from the PSM, pri-
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marily elderly people and families in economic distress who are not covered
under other pension schemes.
5. Following the methodology used by the National Institute of Statistics in
Cape Verde, a household is considered poor if its annual per capita consump-
tion falls below the official poverty line (equivalent to CVEsc 43,249.8 per
capita a year). With that poverty line, 36.7 percent of the population is poor
(equivalent to 28.0 percent of households).
6. Unfortunately, the requisite information for such a study is not included in
the survey data.
7. For a more detailed discussion on the targeting performance of utility tariffs
in Cape Verde, see Wodon et al. (2007).
8. The cost of implementing proxy means testing is usually higher because it re-
quires the involvement of social workers and the use of data processing.
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